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	The Cambridge Platonists were a loose-knit group of philosophers and theologians associated with Cambridge University around the middle of the seventeenth century, the most prominent among them being Henry More (1614–87) and Ralph Cudworth (1617–88). The term “Cambridge Platonist” itself is of nineteenth-century coinage, and, as categorisations go, it is rather clumsy. When scholars attempt to enumerate the figures who are to be regarded as part of the movement, the lists they come up with will rarely be exactly the same. They will normally include Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–51), author of An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (1652): but he was really more of an Aristotelian than a Platonist. And they will often include figures like Joseph Glanvill, John Norris or Anne Conway: but they had little or no association with Cambridge. (Glanvill and Norris were Oxford men. As for Conway, she did work with More in a private capacity: but, as a woman, she was denied formal admission to the university itself). Still, the central core of the group is generally agreed to include, besides More, Cudworth and Culverwell, figures like Benjamin Whichcote (1609–83) and John Worthington (1618–71), who—at least as far as their extant writings are concerned—involved themselves much more in religious matters than in anything properly philosophical; and the philosophers John Smith (1618–52), author of Select Discourses (1660), George Rust (d. 1670), author of A Letter of Resolution concerning Origen (1661) and A Discourse of Truth (1677), and Peter Sterry (1613–72), author of A Discourse of the Freedom of the Will (1675). Most of these figures received their formative training under Whichcote’s leadership at Emmanuel College, a Puritan institution founded in 1584, the chief exceptions being More and Rust at nearby Christ’s College, where Cudworth also worked from 1654.​[1]​
	As far as their influences were concerned, and their so-called Platonism in particular, they tended to draw much more heavily on (to adopt another nineteenth-century term) the Neoplatonists, above all Plotinus, than they did on Plato himself. But, even if—Culverwell aside—they tended to favour the Platonists, they were by no means opposed to Aristotle and his ancient commentators (though less keen on his Medieval Scholastic—i.e. Roman Catholic—interpreters), for they tended to regard the central tenets of Aristotelianism and Platonism as being much closer than we might see them today. And, beyond that, most of them were well versed in an exceptionally broad range of other classical sources, from the Pythagoreans, to the Atomists, to the Stoics, to the Church Fathers, and everything in between. One of the group’s most popular publications was Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678): but, as substantial as its contributions to contemporary philosophical discussions were, it was also celebrated simply as a sourcebook of classical thought, nearly every page being packed with references to the Greek and Latin and occasionally Hebrew literature.
	But it would be quite wrong to think of the Cambridge Platonists as mere antiquarians. They were equally well versed in the most cutting-edge literature of their own era, and they sought to make a positive contribution to those debates, using classical sources very deliberately in service of that end. Descartes’ philosophy looms especially large in their discussions: most of them responded to his work, sometimes quite extensively, and often supportively, though equally often critically.​[2]​ Indeed, Henry More (egged on by Cudworth) actually engaged Descartes directly in one of the most philosophically illuminating correspondences the latter ever had. They had a similarly ambivalent attitude to the works of Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke and the other early fellows of the Royal Society after its foundation in 1660. They could not always agree with them on the metaphysical interpretation of their physical findings: but they valued those findings even so, and sought to reinterpret them in ways that might support their own theories. Indeed, both Cudworth and More (together with his Oxford associate, Joseph Glanvill) were actually elected as fellows of the society in their own right, in 1662 and 1664 respectively. Once the works of Hobbes and Spinoza began to appear, they responded at length to those too, some of the earliest philosophers in Europe to do so: although here their attitude was wholly negative.
	Virtually all of their other major European contemporaries, from Galileo to Pierre Gassendi, also crop up somewhere or other in their writings. And they personally rubbed shoulders with most of the English cultural giants of the same era, from Oliver Cromwell (to whom Sterry was chaplain), to John Milton (also a colleague of Sterry in the Commonwealth administration), to Isaac Newton (who grew up in More’s home town of Grantham, Lincolnshire, and of whom More would later observe at Cambridge: “Mr Newton has a singular Genius to Mathematicks, and I take him to be a good serious man”​[3]​). Although history might have somewhat tended to relegate the Cambridge Platonists to a side-note in seventeenth-century thought, they really did seek to place themselves at the very heart of the intellectual discourse of their own time. Admittedly, Smith and Culverwell both died a little too early to participate fully in many of these debates; and Sterry was perhaps a bit too mystical in his outlook to be considered a mainstream metaphysician: but both More and Cudworth did make serious and often highly penetrating contributions to early modern philosophy.
	As far as their views on material and immaterial substance are concerned, however, their starting point was a much more traditional position. Descartes had opted to define material substance or body in terms of extension, and immaterial substance or mind/soul in terms of thought. But Descartes himself acknowledged the novelty of this approach, declaring indeed: “I am the first to have regarded thought as the principal attribute of an incorporeal substance, and extension as the principal attribute of a corporeal substance.”​[4]​ And the Cambridge Platonists opposed him on both fronts. We will explore their opinions on body and extension later on: but, on the immaterial side of things, their attitude was that the essence of spiritual substance was not to be understood in terms of thought, but rather in terms of vitality, that is, spontaneous self-motion.​[5]​ More scoffed at Descartes’ deviation from this more ancient approach: “that there is no life but what is Cogitative, is a conceit taken up but yesterday, and I believe will as soon expire”.​[6]​
	Consistently across More’s own writings, which he produced in vast quantities over a long career—he was by far the most prolific of all the Cambridge Platonists—he insisted that immaterial substance should be understood in terms of its power to initiate motions and other changes, perhaps partly in itself, but more particularly in the body to which it was united, thereby informing and animating that body. As early as his very first book, the philosophical poems he produced in 1642 (even before he had encountered Descartes’ work), More would write: “Self-moving substance, that be th’ definition / Of souls, that longs to them in generall”.​[7]​ And he would never waver thereafter from this alternative account of the soul’s true principal attribute. Having shrugged off his parents’ Calvinism while still a schoolboy, More vigorously rejected all forms of determinism. He insisted on the libertarian freedom of the human will in particular: but he also argued that other orders of spirit besides human souls could actively introduce brand new motions into the material sphere—rather than merely passively communicating pre-existent motions from one thing into another—and could thereby not only cause bodies to locomote as wholes, but, by operating more particularly on their individual parts, could endow them with their own distinctive forms in the first place.
	One consequence of this understanding of the essence of immaterial substance was that More saw no problem whatsoever in the issue of soul-body union. Descartes, for his part, had arguably faced a real difficulty in explaining how minds and bodies could interact. Thought and extension seemed to have nothing in common, which made it decidedly unclear how substances defined in those terms could possibly affect one another. But, from More’s point of view, there was no more need to explain how a spirit could move a body than there was for Descartes to explain how a mind could think. As far as he was concerned, to have the capacity to influence bodies was just what it was to be a spirit.
	And More was convinced that such animating principles really did need to exist, because of the failure (as he saw it) of the mechanical philosophy to explain the natural phenomena we observe in bodies. On his initial exposure to Cartesian mechanism in the mid-1640s, More was actually rather taken with it. But, as his letters to Descartes of 1648–9 make clear, his support was never total; and, as his later works—especially Enchridion metaphysicum—demonstrate at considerable length, he eventually came to feel that it could actually explain almost nothing at all.​[8]​ More argued that such phenomena as tidal motion, magnetism, light and colour, gravity, the shapes of stars etc., were they to depend on the purely mechanical communication of motion between bodies, simply would not manifest themselves as we do in fact find them. If the phenomena were going to be saved, there needed to be additional principles at work, ones that had the spontaneous capacity to introduce new motions into the physical system, or to check or adjust those that were already there. And, given how More had defined the essence of immaterial substance, directly in terms of such self-motion, these additional principles would automatically qualify as such.
	Cudworth agreed with his learned friend on this, citing More’s analyses of physical phenomena with approval.​[9]​ He too felt that, since the resources of the corporeal system itself, limited as that was to the basic modes of extension—size, shape, motion—and the mechanical laws that could be framed in such terms, were insufficient to explain the observed phenomena, it would be additionally necessary to postulate immaterial substances to regulate the interactions of the material ones. As Cudworth put it, the sheer inadequacy of “Matter, or Passive Extended Bulk”, demanded another kind of substance, “which is far the more Noble of the Two, being that which acts upon the matter and hath a Commanding Power over it… and Internal Self-Activity or Life, which is the Essential Character of Substance Incorporeal; to which Latter belongs not only Cogitation, but also the Power of Moving Body”.​[10]​
	Given that immaterial substance was thus defined in terms of self-activity, rather than cogitation, it immediately followed that More and Cudworth could extend the category far beyond the narrow confines to which Descartes had limited it. From their perspective, thinking substances like the human mind were indeed one subclass of that wider category of spirits: but there were many others too. For instance, More and Cudworth were entirely comfortable with the notion of animal souls, a point on which More pressed Descartes directly in their correspondence.​[11]​ Descartes had regarded brute animals as mere machines. Unlike in the case of a human, whose linguistic and other behaviour bore the hallmarks of genuine thought and therefore required the involvement of an immaterial mind, Descartes felt that the bodily functions of animals could be adequately explained in mechanical terms alone, appealing to nothing beyond the sizes, shapes and law-governed motions of their microscopic parts. He was willing to grant them life and sensation, and even to ascribe souls to them: but only in an equivocal sense, to be interpreted in physiological terms alone, merely as a complex of reflex reactions to physical stimuli. What they lacked, and what set us apart from them, was any form of consciousness of such processes.​[12]​ But this was something that neither More nor Cudworth could accept. They vehemently rejected the suggestion that a mere fortuitous conglomeration and blind interaction of atoms could explain the form of an animal’s body, its various organs all conspiring so harmoniously together towards the preservation and improvement of the whole. As for the use of language—Descartes’ principal reason for singling out humans as the sole owners of thinking, immaterial souls—More asked: “Do not dogs nod ‘yes’ with their tails, as we do with our heads? Do they not often by little barks beg for something to eat at table? Nay, more, sometimes touching their master’s elbow with their paw, as respectfully as they can, they remind him by this fawning sign that he has forgotten them.”​[13]​ Or, if Descartes’ concern was that, by endowing animals with immaterial souls, he might inadvertently find himself obliged to grant them an immortality like our own, they were equally unmoved. More simply took the view that it was better that they should indeed have it, than that we should not.​[14]​ And Cudworth pointed out that the conclusion did not follow anyway. Just as animal souls, being (contra Descartes) immaterial substances, could not be generated out of matter, but would need to be specially created by God, so likewise the fact that such souls were not naturally corruptible would in no way undermine God’s capacity to annihilate them at will.​[15]​
	But they went a whole lot further than merely endowing animals with conscious, immaterial substances. They were equally content to place unconscious—but no less immaterial—substances in plants and even in ostensibly inanimate things. Plants were alive, after all, and it was life, not consciousness, that really counted for the Cambridge Platonists. In The Immortality of the Soul (1659), More enumerated four main species of spirits: “The logoi spermatikoi or Seminall Formes, the Soules of Brutes, the Humane Soule, and that Soule or Spirit which actuates or informes the vehicles of Angels.”​[16]​ Seminal forms were endowed with the “spermatic” or “plastic” (i.e. formative) power of organising the bodies of plants, and regulating their vital functions, these being (in More’s opinion) inexplicable by mechanical principles alone. But they did this work in a purely vegetative and automatic way, according to a plan pre-programmed into them by God, with neither thought nor choice in what they were doing.
	More was basically content to take the old Platonic notion of a tripartite soul on board (while acknowledging that it should perhaps be treated as more metaphorical than literal, interpreted more in terms of faculties than genuine parts).​[17]​ The highest part of a human soul was the intellect. With the arguable exception of Culverwell, the Cambridge Platonists were all staunch rationalists, endowing man with a distinct faculty of pure intellect that could not be explicated in empiricist terms. The middle part was characterized by sensation and will, which humans would have in common with animals. But then the lowest part, common to all three of humans, animals and plants, comprised those non-mechanical plastic powers that were manifested in the formation and regulation of these various different kinds of living body. As More put it, “The lower man is nought but a fair plant.”​[18]​
	Cudworth agreed with More in this. He inserted a long “Digression concerning the Plastick Life of Nature” at the end of the third chapter of the True Intellectual System, wherein he went far beyond merely arguing that animals would need to be granted individual sensitive souls of their own. Just like More, he additionally proposed that purely vegetative souls would need to be recognized in plants. (Peter Sterry also did the same).​[19]​ But then they went further still. They adopted, not only from the Platonists but equally from other ancient schools (e.g. the Stoics), the notion of anima mundi, an all-pervading soul of the world. Given that (as they saw it) so much in the ostensibly inanimate realm—tidal motion, magnetism, light, gravity etc.—could not be explained mechanically, in terms of the intrinsic features of the bodies themselves, it would be necessary to postulate a distinct immaterial, spiritual substance to regulate its affairs. As Cudworth observed: “Besides this Plastick Nature which is in Animals, forming their several Bodies Artificially, as so many Microcosms or Little Worlds, there must be also a general Plastick Nature in the Macrocosm the whole Corporeal Universe, that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and to agree together into one Harmony.”​[20]​
	Now, this universal plastic spirit might have been God himself, as certain Cartesian occasionalists were just beginning to suggest during the final stages of More and Cudworth’s own era. But, even though these English Platonists themselves appear to have been entirely oblivious to the work their younger Continental contemporaries were doing in this area, they did anticipate their proposal, and they rejected it. As Cudworth put it, the occasionalist hypothesis “would render Divine Providence Operose, Sollicitous and Distractious”, it being indecorous to demand that God should “immediately do all the Meanest and Triflingest things himself Drudgingly, without making use of any Inferior and Subordinate Instruments”.​[21]​ Further, they also argued that the empirical phenomena themselves revealed that whatever was driving them had to be bereft of intelligence and free agency, and therefore could not be God. The natural world, as More saw it, was full of errors, bungles and monstrosities. Had it been given its form immediately by God himself, he could surely have been relied upon to make it perfect in every way. Its imperfections therefore demonstrated that some lesser being bore the more direct responsibility for its governance. In More’s opinion, these bungles arose as an inevitable consequence of the strict universality of the laws of nature. (These laws might have been non-mechanical in character, i.e. inexpressible in terms of the sizes, shapes and motions of bodies alone, but they were still “inviolable Adamantine Laws” for all that).​[22]​ The laws as such were good, because mostly they would lead to appropriately harmonious outcomes for the betterment of the whole. But, in certain individual instances, a still better outcome might have been achieved if the executor of the laws had decided to suspend them temporarily, so as to do something else instead.
	Now, that in itself was a fairly standard response to the problem of natural evil: to blame it on the inflexibility of the laws of nature. Indeed, one finds just such a solution developed by the leading occasionalist of the period, Nicolas Malebranche, who maintained that a perfect God would choose to operate in a way that would achieve the most perfect balance between the perfection of the work he produced and the perfection of his simple ways of producing it. God could have suspended the laws of nature in individual cases: but he chose not to, because he recognized the contribution their own universality was making to the perfection of the whole. But the Cambridge Platonists took a different path. For them, these particular imperfections revealed that the laws were being executed by a spirit that was indeed universal, and yet created, not divine. More called this the “Spirit of Nature” or “Hylarchic Principle”, while Cudworth called it “Plastic Nature”. For them, the reason why the laws of nature were never suspended was because this immaterial substance was perfectly oblivious to the results of its action; and, even if had known what it was doing, it would still have lacked the capacity to opt for another course of action instead. It was programmed to execute God’s laws in a purely vegetative way, but without intellect or even sensation, and without free will. As far as its powers were concerned, the Spirit of Nature was therefore just like the seminal form of an individual plant, the whole material universe collectively constituting one great plant body.
	Now, Cudworth’s declared target in the True Intellectual System was atheism in all its forms; and he did consider many such forms. As he saw it, the biggest threat in his own time was the version he felt that he had discovered in the works of people like Hobbes, which he called “Democritic” or “Atomical” atheism. But he also sought to counter what he called the “Hylozoic” atheism of Strato of Lampsacus, and the “Cosmozoic” or “Cosmoplastic” atheism of the Stoics.​[23]​ These were all materialist systems, countenancing no purely immaterial substances at all, and a fortiori no God, or at least none properly worthy of the name. But the difference was that, where the Democritic atheists sought to account for everything solely in terms of the sizes, shapes and motions of particles of matter, the others endowed matter with various intrinsic non-mechanical properties on top of those mechanical ones. According to the hylozoic and cosmozoic atheists, instead of being united to and animated by distinct immaterial substances—minds, souls, seminal forms, plastic natures, or whatever—the bodies themselves would be intrinsically alive, capable of spontaneous self-activity and quite possibly even some rudimentary form of perception from their own internal resources. In the hylozoic version, each individual body would possess a vitality of its own; in the cosmozoic version, such life would be attributed to the universe as a whole.
	Cudworth’s own opinion was that the mechanical features of size, shape and motion really did exhaust the intrinsic properties of material substances. Although he certainly did not regard the natural world as a mechanical system, he felt that the principles that brought life to it would need to be distinct immaterial substances in their own right, and could not be reduced merely to additional, non-mechanical features of the bodies themselves. Indeed, he positively welcomed the revival of the so-called atomical approach to matter—by which he meant merely corpuscularian, more than atomistic in the strict sense—in the hands of figures like Descartes, precisely because its inadequacies could (in his opinion) be used to demonstrate the need for separate spirits. If life and cogitation were to turn out to belong to bodies in their own right, this would undermine the need to postulate anything else. But the atomical hypothesis allowed nothing to body but impenetrable extension and its various modes: “more or less Magnitude with Divisibility, Figure, Site, Motion and Rest, together with the Results of their several Combinations”.​[24]​ Since life and cogitation were nowhere to be seen in this narrow list, it would follow that they were not intrinsic to bodies. They would therefore need to belong to some other kind of substance, an incorporeal one, perhaps united to but nevertheless distinct from matter. Or, again, since the atomical philosophy held that body had no motion from itself, but only ever from the action of some other agent, it could again be used demonstrate that all motion would need to originate in distinct, incorporeal substances. By showing “how far Body can go”, Cudworth felt that this philosophy would also show “where Incorporeal Substance begins”.​[25]​
	When it comes to the other Cambridge Platonists, however, although none of them were hylozoic atheists, they were not always quite as resistant as Cudworth was to the notion of hylozoism as such. They unanimously insisted that bodies (and anything else there might be) would need to be created by an immaterial, wise, omnipotent and providential deity. But, just as long as that point was granted, some of the more mystical among them were rather more willing to allow that (the things we ordinarily regard as) bodies might indeed be intrinsically alive.
	Peter Sterry, for instance, was keen to stress the smoothness in the hierarchical “Jacob’s ladder” of creatures that emanated from God. “Each Being in its lowest division, and narrowest contraction”, he wrote, “beareth imprinted upon it, and inseparable from it, the figure of the first and supream Being”, so that “Nothing is mean and vile, seen in a right and universal Light.” And he went on to cite with approval the way More had described the corporeal world in his philosophical poems of the 1640s, wherein More “painteth out with liveliest colours the whole Universe, as a great Soul and Spirit, as a Contexture, as a Quire, or as a Dance of many Souls or Spirits, where materiality and corporeity are seen, not as distinct substances from the Soul, but as figures wrought by the Soul her self”.​[26]​
	The doctrine of those early poems of More’s had indeed been pretty hylozoic—though, again, definitely not atheistic. However, his opinion was not so much that bodies were intrinsically vital. The point was rather that, by virtue of being intrinsically vital, these things would not really qualify as bodies at all. His attitude was that everything that emanated from God would need to reflect God’s own simple nature. But God’s nature was that of a living, active being. Consequently, all of his creatures would inherit that same character to a greater or lesser degree. Everything in the universe was therefore alive. But life, remember, was the defining attribute of an immaterial spirit. A body, the opposite of this, would by definition be an entirely dead and passive thing. So what room did that leave in the universe for there to be any bodies at all? More’s answer was clear: “I nere ment / To grant that there’s any such thing existent / As a mere body: For all’s life, all spright.”​[27]​ Although in other contexts More was happy to slip back into more familiar language of corporeality, his considered opinion was that really there was no such thing as a mere body: for all was life, all was spirit. Or, again: “who can prove their corporalitie / Since matter which thereto’s essentiall / If rightly sifted’s but a phantasie. / … / What ever is, is Life and Energie / From God, who is th’ Originall of all”.​[28]​
	Admittedly, the things we ordinarily take for bodies did only possess such life to a minimal degree. As far as their powers were concerned, they were as far below the seminal forms of plants as those were from animal souls, those in turn from human minds, and those from the spirits of angels. And yet, however attenuated these powers might be in the entities at the bottom of the ontological hierarchy, they could never quite be extinguished altogether: for then these would not qualify as entities at all. They had nowhere else to get their reality from, but from God; and God possessed no other kind of reality to give them apart from a vital spirituality like his own. To take just one more instance from More’s early writings, he put the same point to Descartes directly in one of his 1649 letters: “all that is called ‘body’ is really a stupefied and sottish life, inasmuch as, though it has neither sensation nor animadversion, it constitutes the last and faintest shadow and image of the divine essence, which I take to be the most perfect life”.​[29]​ (As should really go without saying, Descartes was decidedly unimpressed by this suggestion).
	Later on, we find the same position embraced by another pair who were close to the Cambridge Platonists, and to More in particular. Anne, Viscountess Conway, had first encountered More around 1650 through her half-brother, John Finch, a student of his at Cambridge. Although she herself was precluded from entering the university, More took her under his wing as his private protégée, training her in his own quasi-Cartesian Neoplatonism. But she was a quick learner, and she soon became his philosophical equal, and even something of an inspiration to him in his own work. Conway, however, was tormented by chronic ill-health and, in 1670, Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont entered her household as her personal physician. But he was much more than that. The son of the great chemist, Jean-Baptiste van Helmont, Francis Mercury was a philosopher in his own right, who brought with him a keen interest in esoteric thought, from Paracelsianism to Cabbala. During the 1670s, Conway and van Helmont, with occasional (though progressively diminishing) input from More himself, worked together in developing a novel synthesis of their own respective influences.
	With regard to the issue at hand, Conway firmly agreed that, given that creatures could only inherit the reality they had from the God who created them, and given that he was essentially a vital, active being, so too would they be. But, if vitality was the essential, defining characteristic of a spirit, and bodies were defined by its total absence, it would follow that there were not really any bodies in the universe: “since the goodness of God is a living goodness, which possesses life, knowledge, love, and power, which he communicates to his creatures, how can any dead thing proceed from him or be created by him, such as mere body or matter”? Dead matter, as far as she was concerned, was “completely non-being, a vain fiction and Chimera, and an impossible thing”.​[30]​ Van Helmont likewise agreed that the creatures God produced would need to reflect his own vitality, and would therefore more properly qualify as spirits. But some of these spirits, he explained, would fall from their initial state of perfection, their active powers would be diminished, and they would take on some of the characteristics associated with matter. Certain clusters of these corporeo-spiritual monads—the term “monad” being van Helmont’s, the term “corporeo-spiritual” being More’s—would then coalesce together to form the familiar bodies of everyday experience. And yet these beings could never fall infinitely far from their original state, and therefore could never completely relinquish their vitality and indeed perception, however reduced these might become. Moreover, they could hope eventually to rise back up through the ontological hierarchy through which they had initially fallen, to become more eminently spiritual once more.​[31]​
	That notion of a fall and rise of souls was not only common to van Helmont and Conway, but was also a recurring theme in More’s own work, all throughout his career. Where they were drawing on a broad range of esoteric sources, such as the Lurianic Cabbala, he had already found much the same opinion developed by the Neoplatonists, especially Origen. From The Praeexistency of the Soul, included in the 1647 collection of his Philosophicall Poems, to the Annotations upon Lux Orientalis, included in his 1682 edition of Two Choice and Useful Treatises, More consistently argued for the pre-existence of the human soul. The Bible itself says that God created the world in six days and then rested, which More interpreted to mean not merely that he had stopped creating new species of creature, but had also stopped creating new individuals.​[32]​ Rather than being freshly created by God with the formation of the new organic structures of (equally pre-existing) atoms to which they would be united, all souls were created together at once at the outset, and would pass through a sequence of successive reincarnations thereafter.​[33]​
	The Lux Orientalis that More was here annotating was a work by his Oxford associate, Joseph Glanvill, who had himself pressed therein for the pre-existence and transmigration of the soul, by means of arguments to which More happily gave his endorsement. And Glanvill and More’s opinions here were also shared with the author of the anonymous A Letter of Resolution concerning Origen and the chief of his Opinions (1661), generally taken to have been another Cambridge man, George Rust (who was also, as it happens, the author of A Discourse of Truth, the other of the Two Choice and Useful Treatises). It should be noted that Ralph Cudworth did disagree with More, Glanvill and Rust on this point, favouring instead the successive creation of souls.​[34]​ Nathaniel Culverwell likewise rejected the pre-existence of the soul, and with it the Platonic theory of knowledge as reminiscence, favouring instead an Aristotelian tabula rasa.​[35]​ Cudworth rejected the epistemology of reminiscence too, although—unlike Culverwell—he most certainly did believe that we came into the world with innate ideas: it was just that these ideas, for him, were created with the soul as the soul was created with the body, rather than preceding the latter.​[36]​ But then, even More—who accepted pre-existence—declined to frame his epistemology in terms of reminiscence.​[37]​ As for Sterry, he introduced the question of pre-existence, but then set it aside as being beside his purpose, leaving it to the freedom of every spirit to decide.​[38]​
	Still, even if the pre-existence of the soul was not universally accepted among the Cambridge Platonists, they were, as a group, considerably more sympathetic to it than many of their contemporaries. This simply reflected the depth of the scholarly erudition and respect they had for the wisdom of the ancients, drawing here not only on Origen but also on much wider traditions, both philosophical and religious, Christian, Jewish, Indian, Egyptian, Persian and Pagan. The thought was that all souls were created together in the beginning, in a state of the highest perfection to which a creature could attain; but that, through the misuse of their free will, they would subsequently defect from this state, and render themselves progressively less perfect. To the extent that a spirit, simply in virtue of being such, would be not only able but naturally disposed to animate matter, even the more perfect spirits would still be united to material structures of some kind or other: but their vehicles, befitting their own intrinsic perfection, would be composed of the most sublime heavenly aether. More and the others, here including Cudworth, generally dismissed the notion of a wholly disembodied spirit, regarding with scepticism the speculations of some of the later Neoplatonists (chiefly Proclus) about “Noës” and “Henads”, pure intellects that were supposed to have no relation to matter at all.​[39]​ For them, even the angels themselves would be united to aethereal vehicles. However, as some of the initially perfect spirits fell from that original state, they would pass through a sequence of coarser and coarser vehicles, down through the air, and eventually into solid human bodies. But then the hope was that, by progressively perfecting themselves, these immortal souls could re-ascend through the same sequence, finally freeing themselves of the prison of their terrestrial incarnations and returning to the aethereal heavens.​[40]​
	But one point of difference, even among those who embraced this notion of a fall and rise of souls, through successive transmigrations, lay with the issue of precisely how far that fall might extend. Origen, Plotinus and many of the other ancient Platonists had maintained that, having first descended far enough as to become joined to a terrestrial human body, a soul might then continue to degrade itself still further. If it freely chose to abandon itself to its animal lusts, neglecting its higher intellectual and moral nature, it could become the soul of an animal in its next incarnation. Indeed, it could then continue to sink even further, relinquishing the power of sensation to become the life of a plant.​[41]​ Conway and van Helmont just took this one stage further, allowing that even its vegetative powers might become so diminished that it would become one of those dull, corporeo-spiritual monads that collectively constituted the bodies to which the higher orders of spirits would be getting united. For More, however, it was essential to the human soul that it should possess a double nature, partly animal but also partly divine. As humans, we would face conflicting motivations, the one for the sensual indulgence of our self-love, the other for the moral virtues of humility, charity and purity. The freedom of the human will would consist in our capacity to choose between these competing impulses, voluntarily handing ourselves over to either virtue or vice; and, the more that we perfected ourselves by choosing virtue, the better we could expect our next incarnation to be. But it was this duality that set us apart from the purely animal souls of the brute beasts. Although those souls might indeed be immortal, just as ours were, they were nevertheless wholly devoid of those divine virtues, and consequently they could never perfect themselves above the animal state to achieve the kind of salvation to which we could aspire. Equally, on the other side, human souls were distinguished from the spirits of angels, whose nature was purely divine. Just as the animal souls could never rise above their terrestrial incarnations, so too would angelic spirits only ever animate aerial or aethereal vehicles, and would never be degraded as far as the terrestrial sphere. It was only human souls that could actually cross the boundary between the terrestrial and the heavenly realms. For, although one or other of these two poles of human nature might come to dominate over its rival, still neither of them would ever be completely extinguished. Our souls, therefore, could never degrade themselves quite as far as that purely animal state, let alone into a vegetative state, and still less into corporeo-spiritual state.
	This much does seem to have been a consistent commitment throughout More’s career, even while he was still committed to the same kind of gradual monism that characterized the later ontologies of Conway and van Helmont. The things we regard as bodies might have possessed an intrinsic vitality, so as to qualify more properly as spirits than as mere bodies. Nevertheless, there were limits to how far any given individual might actually move through this hierarchy. But still, on that fundamental point about the intrinsic vitality of those supposed bodes, Conway and van Helmont’s views were in line with those of More: but only with the early More. By the time his friends had actually started to develop their joint system in the 1670s, More himself had abandoned even that element of their doctrine.
	He argued against it in a short Latin tract entitled The Foundations of the Philosophy or Cabbala of the Eagle-Boy-Bee, written around 1675, first published in Christian Knorr von Rosenroth’s collection of cabbalistic texts, Kabbala denudata (1677), and then reprinted in More’s own Opera omnia (1679).​[42]​ (He also argued against the comparably hylozoic or “biusian” theory of Francis Glisson, in a scholium appended to Ad V.C. epistola altera, his critique of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus in that same volume of Opera omnia).​[43]​ In the Foundations, More began by laying out the key principles of (in particular) van Helmont’s version of the system, then proceeded to offer a refutation of them, and then, in a scholium, described a dream he had had, of an eagle that transformed itself first into a boy and then into a buzzing bee (thereby explaining the rather peculiar title). The bee was supposed to illustrate the nature of these corporeo-spiritual monads, alive yet sluggish and unintelligent. As far as More was now concerned, the problem with this position was that it tended towards pantheism, by denying any true creation—a point that van Helmont was at pains to deny in A Cabbalistical Dialogue, his own reply to More’s tract, which followed immediately after it in Kabbala denudata and was then separately published in English. In fact, it was even worse than that. As More saw it, not only did these corporeo-spirits fail to achieve any real distinction from the substance of God himself, but, to the extent that they were all supposed to be distinct from one another, the result would be polytheism; and that polytheism in turn, given how imperfect these beings had become through their fall, would ultimately just boil down to another form of materialist atheism. Even in his defence of this theory against More’s criticisms, van Helmont did concede that there was, if not a numerical identity between God and the quasi-corporeal beings that emanated from him, then nevertheless a “specifical, or a generical Identity” between them.​[44]​ And he compared this to the relation that held between a mind and its ideas, or a substance and its accidents, or the Sun and its beams of light.​[45]​ In his poems, more than thirty years earlier, More himself had been quite comfortable with such analogies. But he had now come round to the view that this was far too intimate a relation between God and the universe, and that a much more robust distinction needed to be drawn between them, so as to avoid inadvertently staining God with the imperfections of matter. In the general preface to this same volume of his Opera omnia, More recalled his poems and identified two issues on which he had since changed his mind, the second of which he called “Actinism, or the doctrine of the radiation of all substances”.​[46]​ He now felt that it was important to construe the production of the universe not as a matter of necessary emanation from God’s own substance, but as a strictly voluntary act of creation out of nothing.
	And it was in parallel with that increasing emphasis on the ontological separation between God and creation that More also came to insist upon an equally sharp separation between matter and spirit. He continued to treat self-activity as the central, defining characteristic of spiritual substance (an “immaterial substance intrinsically endowed with life and the faculty of moving”), and its total absence as characteristic of body (“a material substance devoid in itself of all perception and life, and indeed all motion”).​[47]​ But, whereas he had formerly denied that anything genuinely answering to that latter description existed in reality, he now shifted to a resolutely dualist theory of created substance, embracing both kinds. Whereas the life and motion of bodies had formerly been explained partly in terms of the activity from without of a really distinct and wholly immaterial substance, but partly also in terms of their own self-activity within, More shifted to treating it as exclusively the responsibility of the former. In certain cases, such as that of the human body, this might involve a particular soul, united thereto. In other cases, in what we ordinarily regard as the inanimate part of the physical world, it would involve the universal Spirit of Nature. Either way, the body was “a material substance coalescing into one thing by an alien life, and participating in life and motion from it… since we have so solidly proved above that matter is endowed with no perception, no life, and no motion from its own nature or from itself”.​[48]​
	The other of the two issues—alongside “actinism”—on which More said that he had changed his mind, between the era of his Philosophicall Poems (1642–7) and his Opera omnia (1679), was “holenmerianism”. Derived from the Greek for “whole in parts”, this was the title he gave to the doctrine that a spiritual substance would indeed be located in the spatial world, and yet would not be extended through it in the manner of a body. A body would occupy a certain region of space by being spread throughout its various sub-regions by means of distinct parts outside parts of its own, partly here and partly there. A spirit, by contrast, would be (to borrow a traditional Scholastic formula) whole in the whole, and whole in each part. In the human case, for instance, all of the various component organs that collectively constituted the person’s body would be scattered across several different (though adjacent) places, rather than penetrating one another in a single place. And yet it would be one and the same indivisible soul that was wholly present in each of these organs, the whole of the soul in the person’s head and simultaneously the whole of the soul also some distance away in the person’s foot. As for God, he would be substantially omnipresent: but it would be the whole of the indivisible substance of God that was repeated in each and every part of the spatial, corporeal world. This had indeed been the dominant position among philosophers historically, including the Neoplatonists and the Fathers of the Church on whom our Cambridge Platonists drew so heavily, together with the bulk of the Scholastic Aristotelians. So it was only to be expected that the Cambridge Platonists themselves would be drawn to this account of spiritual presence, at least to begin with.
	Sure enough, in his poems, we find More declaring that “in each Atom of the matter wide / The totall Deity doth entirely won [i.e. ‘dwell’, archaically], / His infinite presence doth therein reside, / And in this presence infinite powers do ever abide.”​[49]​ And he explained why it was necessary to resort to this alternative mode of presence for God: “if we forsake this apprehension of the omnipraesency of Ahad [i.e. The One of the Neoplatonists], God and all things else will prove mere bodies. And then must God, if he can, make himself up in severall parcells and pieces”.​[50]​ And likewise for the human soul. Although that was not present everywhere, it was nevertheless wholly present wherever it was present at all: “th’humane souls essence / Is indivisible, yet every where / In this her body…. / Therefore one spirit goes / Through all this bulk, not by extension / But by a totall Self-reduplication / … / And present is in each part totally / Of this her body.”​[51]​ More felt that it was important to endow spirits with a mode of spatial presence quite unlike that of bodies, for it was precisely in virtue of the fact that bodies were spread out with distinct parts outside parts that they would be rendered susceptible to division, and hence corruption and destruction. If those parts were distinct from one another, it should in principle be possible for them to be separated from one another, and for the whole thereby to be taken apart. At the same time, he still felt that it was important to endow spirits with some form of spatial presence, because to exclude them from the extended world altogether would leave them in no position to act upon extended things. This holenmerian theory was designed as a middle way, to avoid the problems inherent in both the materialism of people like Hobbes on the one hand, and, on the other, the opinion to which More gave the name “nullibism” (from the Latin for “nowhere”), which he attributed to Descartes.
	The nullibist doctrine was that spirits, qua substances, were simply nowhere. Although they could indeed act on spatial things—God on everything, and the human soul on the particular body to which it was united—they themselves were not spatially present where those bodies were at all, whether by wholes or by parts. But More argued that such presence was a necessary precondition for such a capacity for action. He put the point to Descartes directly in their correspondence, arguing for the conclusion that God intimately occupied both the whole universe and each particle thereof on the grounds that he could not have impressed motion into the matter of the universe unless he “closely touched” it.​[52]​ Equally, a created mind would need to be granted a circumscribed presence wherever its own individual body was, on the grounds that the power whereby it acted upon that body was “an intrinsic mode of the mind, and clearly not something distinct from the mind itself”.​[53]​ Spirits, for More, could not act on bodies at a distance—or, more precisely, without presence—any more than other bodies could. To the extent that its effects would be felt in the extended world, at least the power of the spirit would need to be located in that world. But, as far as More was concerned, the presence of the power entailed the presence of the substance to which this power belonged and from which it could not be separated. And this was a line of argument that More never gave up, returning to it many times over the subsequent decades, his fullest discussion of it coming in the penultimate chapter 27 of Enchiridion metaphysicum. Although More did not regard Descartes personally as being a materialist atheist, he felt that the tenets of his philosophy were veering dangerously close to it. The notion that the material system could regulate itself solely from its own intrinsic mechanical resources seemed to eliminate God’s providence from the world; while the suggestion that God did not exist anywhere seemed tantamount to saying simply that God did not exist.
	However, whereas at the time of the Descartes correspondence More was rejecting nullibism in favour of holenmerianism, in his later works he was rejecting both together in favour of a third option. In that same chapter 27 of Enchiridion metaphysicum, More argued equally against holenmerianism. He pointed out, for instance, that, if the whole of a spirit was in one place, there would be quite simply none of it left to be in another. Further, the doctrine that the spirit was whole in the whole and whole in each part of the body would render the former as minute as the smallest part of the latter, and yet also many times greater than itself. And, to the extent that the doctrine had been motivated by the worry that the ascription of the “parts outside parts” form of extension to spirits might render them susceptible to division into those parts, More pointed out that this alternative doctrine would itself render them no less susceptible to division into several wholes, which would scarcely suit the essential unity of a spiritual substance any better.
	Having abandoned his own early holenmerianism, alongside the nullibism he had always rejected, More arrived at the opinion that “Extension or Amplitude is an intrinsecall or essential Property of Ens quatenus Ens [being qua being], as the Metaphysicians phrase it”.​[54]​ Just as he had rejected Descartes’ definition of incorporeal substance in terms of thought, in favour of an alternative definition in terms of self-activity, so too would he reject Descartes’ definition of corporeal substance in terms of extension. For More, as he explained at length in the closing chapter 28 of Enchiridion metaphysicum (and in many other places in his works from 1659 onwards), the spirits were just as truly extended as the bodies themselves. The human soul shared the dimensions of the terrestrial body (or aerial or aethereal vehicle) that it was animating, while God was extended throughout the entire universe. Indeed, it was God’s own immaterial amplitude that constituted the space in which all finite things found their various locations. And More really did mean “extension” in a strict sense: these spirits were not merely spatially present in some vague manner or other, but were present by being spread out through a certain space, partly here and partly there, one part of the soul in a person’s head and a different part in the foot. And yet More still had no intention of falling in with Hobbes’s materialist treatment of such things. Although he came to regard both spirits and bodies as equally extended, More remained as keen as ever to avoid staining the former with the imperfections of the latter. Consequently, alongside the fact that spiritual substances were supposed to be active and material substances only passive, he expanded his account of their essential difference by adding that spirits should be indivisible and penetrable, and bodies divisible and impenetrable.​[55]​
	More conceded that, to the extent that these extended spirits really did have different parts in different places, it would follow that we could consider one such part separately from another, and that this might be regarded as a form of mental separation. So he opted for a more precise term, “indiscerpible”, to signify the kind of attribute he had in mind, in preference to the more general and ambiguous term “indivisible”. Spirits, he declared, were “intellectually divisible, but Physically indiscerpible”.​[56]​ Whatever distinctions we might make between these parts in our thoughts, still no power at all—not even divine omnipotence—could ever bring about an actual separation between them. God could easily annihilate a spirit altogether: but, for as long as it continued to exist at all, it would need to exist as an integrated unit, its parts all remaining joined in contiguity. This was because a spirit was ens unum per se and non per aliud, one being through itself and not through another.​[57]​ The parts of a material extension, by contrast, would need to be held together by some distinct thing. Descartes had argued that the cohesion of particles in a solid body could be explained simply in terms of the fact that they were at rest with respect to one another: but, for More, this was merely restating, not explaining, the fact that they were cohering. As far as he was concerned, these parts would need to be held together by the plastic power of an animating spirit, whether that should be a human or animal soul, or the seminal form of a plant, or the Spirit of Nature that animated the universe at large. And, if the unifying force of this spirit was withdrawn or overcome, those material parts could very easily be separated from one another and scattered, not only by God but even by natural forces.
	The point was that, although spirits and bodies were both extended, and their respective extensions could both be construed in terms of wholes and parts, the priority between these was reversed in the two cases. In contemplating the extension of a spirit, our starting point would be the whole: but we might then consider this amplitude only partially, by focusing our intellectual attention on the region that was congruent to some lesser part of the body, such as the head, or on another occasion perhaps the foot. We would thereby arrive at distinctions of reason between these merely “notional or logical parts”. And we could recognize that these were indeed spatially spread out, one outside another, thereby warranting the application of the term “extension”. However, such purely conceptual distinctions between these notional parts would never entail any real separability between them. Such separations, indeed, could not even be thought, let alone achieved: for a notional part was merely an artefact of our own contemplation, as we attended to a certain region without giving any regard, one way or the other, to the rest, not by considering it as existing in the absence of the rest. When it came to material extensions, by contrast, it was the parts that were prior. For a body, the whole arose out of the juxtaposition and cohesion of a variety of parts: but each of these parts would still retain its own really distinct identity as a material substance in its own right, ontologically independent of the rest, and consequently liable to separation from them.
	So much for divisibility and indivisibility (or “discerpibility” and “indiscerpibility”). As for penetrability and impenetrability, the idea there was that the presence of a body in a certain place would exclude all other bodies from that place for as long as it remained there. A spirit, however, being essentially penetrable, could come to exist in the same place as a body, not just by squeezing into its pores as air or aether might do, but by intimately permeating its own proper dimensions. More believed that, although a vacuum was a genuine possibility—a point for which he argued in his correspondence with Descartes—the material world was still actually a plenum. God could have left certain spaces free of matter, had it suited his purposes to do so: but, given the overflowing fecundity of his omnipotence, this was something that he would never do. Therefore, if spirits were going to exist in the same extended world, their presence had better not be excluded by the bodies that were there. And it was indeed by being co-present with a certain body, through penetration, that a spirit would have the opportunity to exercise the animating power that was essential to it as a spirit. 
	Indeed, More went further. Spirits were able to penetrate not only bodies, but also other spirits. Both God himself and the created Spirit of Nature were supposed to permeate the entire universe: so their own respective extensions had better not exclude one another, nor exclude the extensions of particular created spirits such as human souls. And More was a firm believer in witches, ghosts and demonic possession, compiling extensive testimonies of such phenomena (especially in the third book of An Antidote Against Atheism, and in his edition of Joseph Glanvill’s Saducismus Triumphatus). But how better to explain tales of demonic possession than by supposing that there were several distinct spirits all cohabiting in a single body and vying for control over it, penetrating the dimensions not only of that body but equally of one another? Moreover, not only could one spirit penetrate a distinct spirit, but spirits—finite ones, at any rate—also had a capacity for self-penetration. A person’s body, after all, would grow and perhaps shrink over the course of a lifetime. The body itself would genuinely gain new matter through accretion, as formerly extraneous particles gradually came to cohere with it, and it could also lose matter as once-united particles came to separate from the rest in corporeal division. But two spirits could not become one, any more than a single spirit could be discerped into two. The only way for the same essentially unified spiritual extension to take up a lesser volume would be for it to fold in on itself, with certain parts moving inwards to overlap with other parts that were already there; and the only way for it to take up a greater volume would be to unfurl itself, with formerly interpenetrating parts spreading themselves out into new (though still immediately adjacent) places. And it was in order to account for this possibility of self-penetration that More introduced the notion of “essential spissitude”, which he described as a fourth mode or dimension peculiar to spirits, alongside the length, breadth and depth that they shared with bodies. The more that a single spirit contracted itself into a narrower space, or the more that several distinct spirits came to penetrate one another therein, the thicker with spiritual substance that place would become. This would also increase the “hylopathia” in that place, a kind of spiritual analogue of corporeal impenetrability. The greater the quantity of spiritual substance that was there, the harder it would be for any more spirits or parts of spirits to squeeze into it, until eventually a “saturation” point was reached and the place would become impenetrable to any further spiritual substance—although still penetrable to bodies.
	However, the more bells and whistles that More added to his theory of spiritual extension, with this ever more convoluted menagerie of concepts and neologisms—terms like “nullibism”, “holenmerianism”, “indiscerpibility”, “essential spissitude” and “hylopathia”, none of which ever really caught on in the literature at large—the more that he was branching out on his own, and leaving his fellow Cambridge Platonists behind. Ralph Cudworth was not exactly opposed to More’s theory, for he was satisfied that his friend did at least have his heart in the right place, and was merely trying to figure out how best to preserve the essential unity and natural immortality of a spirit against the threats of the materialists. Nevertheless, he had little personal sympathy for More’s novel account, preferring instead to side with the theory with the far greater weight of tradition behind it, namely the so-called holenmerian doctrine of the Neoplatonists, the Church Fathers and the bulk of the Scholastic Aristotelians.
	The third in the long sequence of atheistic objections that Cudworth presented in the second chapter of his True Intellectual System was grounded in classical Epicureanism. God, like all things, must be either extended or unextended: but (i) what is unextended is nothing, for extension is an attribute of being qua being. Among extended things, some will be penetrable and others impenetrable: but (ii) what is penetrably extended is mere empty space or vacuum, that is, nothing; and (iii) and what is impenetrably extended is body and therefore cannot be divine. Therefore, there can be no God.​[58]​ Having laid out these atheistic objections in chapter 2, when it finally came time—700 folio pages later!—to tackle them in chapter 5, Cudworth’s first strategy here was to question the second of these claims. Should there turn out to be an immaterial space, extended yet penetrable and distinct from body, such space could not simply be nothing at all (as the Epicureans had construed the void), but would need to be referred to a real incorporeal substance as an affection thereof. And, since the Epicureans were also claiming that this space was infinite, that incorporeal substance could be none other than an infinite deity, “just as some Learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted”.​[59]​ Cudworth was by now not only in the same university as Henry More but even in the same college as him, having become Master of Christ’s in 1654, and his allusion to More here is unmistakable. It had indeed been More’s opinion that the real infinite space that underlay the universe and provided all things with their locations was “to be look’d upon as the permanent Expansion or Amplitude of the radical Essentiality of God”.​[60]​ And at the time this was a decidedly idiosyncratic view—although it did become more prominent two or three decades later, after figures like Isaac Newton and his supporter Samuel Clarke took up the theme and developed it in their own way.
	A little later, Cudworth alluded again to some of the finer details of More’s mature view. There were certain defenders of incorporeal substance, he observed, who drew a distinction between two different kinds of extension. Besides the impenetrable and really divisible extension of bodies, he wrote, “they affirm, that there is another Incorporeal Extension, which is both Penetrable, and also Indiscerpible; so that no One Part thereof, can possibly be Separated from another, or the whole; and that to such an Incorporeal Extension, as this, belongeth Life, Cogitation, and Understanding, the Deity having such an Infinite Extension, but all Created Spirits, a Finite and Limited one: which also is in them supposed to be Contractible and Dilatable”.​[61]​ Cudworth had the courtesy not to embarrass his friend by actually naming as the author of this opinion, and it would have been besides his purpose to set about refuting it in any direct way: “it is not our part here, to oppose Theists, but Atheists”.​[62]​ However, the general tenor of his discussion does indicate that this was not an opinion that he shared: for his own view rested instead on a rejection of the first step in the above argument. Unlike More, Cudworth was willing to concede that three-dimensional extension, with parts outside parts, might indeed entail divisibility and impenetrability, and therefore corporeality: but his reaction was to defend the possibility and reality of unextended incorporeal substances.​[63]​
	As was his wont, Cudworth tended to place this alternative account in the mouths of the ancients, quoting extensively from authorities like Plato, Aristotle, Philo, Porphyry, Origen, Augustine, Boethius and Plotinus, rather than openly declaring it to be his own personal opinion. The real target being atheism, he did not wish to exclude alternative ways of confronting that enemy (such as More’s), by clinging too dogmatically to any one approach in his own presentation. But it was clear enough where his sympathies lay: namely with the notion that incorporeal substances were “Unextended, Indistant, and Devoid of Magnitude”.​[64]​ And this appearance was later confirmed by the testimony of his own daughter (and John Locke’s close friend), Damaris Masham. As it happens, Masham herself did actually favour the Morean view, confiding to Leibniz in 1704: “extension is to me, inseparable from the notion of all substance… but of an unextended substance I have not any conception”.​[65]​ And yet she conceded that this might simply have been a failure of her own apprehension: “For I remember my father as well as other assertors of unextended substance to have said: That it is an imposition of imagination upon their reason in those who cannot be convinced of the reality of substances unextended.”​[66]​
	In particular, her father had suggested “that the Deity was not Part of it Here, and Part of it There, nor the Substance thereof Mensurable by Yards and Poles, as if there were so much of it contained in one Room, and so much and no more in another, according to their several Dimensions; but that the whole Undivided Deity, was at once in Every Part of the world, and consequently No where Locally after the manner of Bodies”.​[67]​ That is to say, Cudworth was a holenmerian; and (though again without naming More) he directly answered the various challenges that More had posed for that position, drawing especially on discussions from Plotinus, Porphyry and Simplicius.​[68]​ And Cudworth’s diagnosis of the misunderstanding that had led people like More to find this mode of spiritual presence so problematic was precisely as his daughter would later be reporting: “that whatsoever is Unextended, and hath no Distant Parts, one without another, must therefore needs be Nothing, is no Common Notion, but the Spurious Suggestion of Imagination only, and a Vulgar Errour”.​[69]​ The common flaw in More’s anti-holenmerian arguments, as Cudworth saw it, lay in the fact that More could not free himself from the prejudice that a spirit ought to possess a magnitude that was at least analogous to that of a body, even when the target of his arguments was a flat denial of that very prejudice. For instance, More had argued that, if the whole of a spirit was going to be present in a minutely extended particle of matter, this would entail that its own magnitude should be equally small. But Cudworth’s straightforward response was that there was no danger that a spirit might turn out to be minutely extended, for the simple reason that it was not extended at all. 
	For Cudworth then, immaterial substances, even qua substances, were indeed co-present where the bodies on which they acted were located—Cudworth did not go so far as to fall in with the “nullibist” camp—but this was with the more traditional “whole in each part” mode of presence, rather than the kind of spiritual extension that More had described. He did still agree with More that these substances were essentially indivisible, and they would certainly need to be penetrable too (for otherwise they would be excluded from the world by the presence of those bodies themselves). But no manner of parts outside parts could be conceived in them.
	Among the other Cambridge Platonists, some of them (such as Whichcote, Worthington or Culverwell, more interested as they were in matters of religion and morality than in abstract metaphysics) did not really address these issues at all. Peter Sterry and John Smith did say at little: but, like Cudworth, they too refused to grant any kind of extension to spiritual substances. Sterry observed: ‘There is with them no distance of Space, or division of Parts. All Spirits intimately, entirely, throughout, penetrate, possess, and inhabit each other, transcending all this Image, and measure of space, of place, of corporeal extension.’​[70]​ In particular: ‘God by his Omnipresence, and undivided Unity, is every where, in every Creature, in every part and point of the Creation, with the fullness of his Glories and Godhead…. Where-ever he is present, He is entirely present with all the Joys and Glories of eternity, ever undivided.’​[71]​ As for Smith, he insisted that God’s omnipresence should not be conceived “by an Infinite Expanse or Extension of Essence, as by an unlimited power”. God’s power reached indeed to every point throughout the whole material universe, but “we cannot find any of the Properties of Quantity mixing themselves with it”.​[72]​ By applying the omnipresence specifically to the power of God, rather than to his own substance or essence as such, Smith came perhaps the closest of them all to embracing outright nullibism.
	Still, although there were differences among the Cambridge Platonists, like these on the questions of spiritual extension, or the pre-existence of the soul, or whether there really was anything in the universe answering to the definition of a wholly lifeless body at all, there did remain a great deal of agreement in their opinions. Putting that last issue (as articulated in More’s early writings, or here and there in Sterry) to one side, the Cambridge Platonist ontology was firmly dualist. They agreed that the most central, defining feature of immaterial substance should be understood not in terms of thought, but rather in terms of an intrinsic principle of spontaneous activity and, with it, the power to animate a body. Maybe some such substances would be additionally privileged with a capacity for perception, thought and reason, but others would be purely vegetative and plastic, forming and moving bodies in non-mechanical ways, usually individual bodies but maybe also the entire universe together as one. In addition, such spirits would certainly be indivisible; and, as a consequence of this, they would be naturally immortal—though still, of course, annihilable by the God who created them in the first place. And they would also be penetrable, capable of permeating (whether by true extension, or by that alternative “whole in each part” mode of presence) the dimensions of the bodies they were animating (whether those should be terrestrial bodies of flesh and blood or, for departed souls or angels, aerial or aethereal vehicles).
	And then, over on the other side, the material substances themselves (if any) would simply be opposite to this in every way. Bodies would be purely passive, capable perhaps of redistributing existing motions from one to another through impact, but never of introducing brand new motions into the physical system. They would be divisible, maybe infinitely so, or at least down as far as the atomic level; and consequently they would be naturally corruptible, subject to destruction by disintegration. And they would be impenetrable, excluding the presence of any other bodies from their places, even as spirits could still freely enter or leave. On these points, pretty much all of the Cambridge Platonists could agree. 
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